One script infected 178 sites: BBC, CNN, Zoom and 32 in banking
On November 16, 2026, a flaw in Optimizely let attackers inject malicious code into the websites of 178 organizations, 32 of them in banking and finance. Opening the page was enough. Here is what happened and what to check on your own website today.
On Monday, November 16, 2026, anyone who opened the BBC, CNN or Zoom could be served malicious code without clicking anything. Nobody hacked those sites: attackers hacked a component they all loaded. Here is what happened and, above all, what you should review, because your website also runs code written by another company.
What happened with Optimizely on November 16
The discovery came from researcher Scott Helme and his team at Report URI. Checking 1,611 Optimizely snippets, they found 188 infected ones across 178 organizations, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax. Banking and finance was the hardest-hit sector, with 32 organizations. Report URI warns the real number is likely higher.
The attacker never touched those companies' servers. The code was written into a field in each Optimizely project that runs on every page, so the script kept arriving from the vendor's legitimate domain.
- 04:21 UTC
First injection
Report URI sees the first altered snippet, the BBC's.
- 08:28 UTC
Crypto theft
The code that replaces wallet addresses starts loading.
- 13:43 UTC
Card skimming
The attacker adds a skimmer that captures number, expiry and CVV.
- 19:24 UTC
Discovery
Report URI's sweep identifies the infected snippets.
- 23:11 UTC
Cleanup
Every file Report URI was monitoring shows as clean.

Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. It says it blocked the vulnerable path, removed the code, ended sessions and revoked tokens, and is investigating with outside experts. It has not explained how the flaw was exploited.
Report URI traced about $7,000 in cryptocurrency sent to the attacker's wallets. What remains unknown is how many cards, cookies or devices were compromised.
Why does this matter to a mid-sized company?
Because the problem is not Optimizely. It is the model. Analytics, chat, advertising, A/B testing: every third-party script has, inside your page, the same permissions as your own code. And the attack asked nothing of the visitor; according to researchers quoted by KrebsOnSecurity, the code ran as soon as the page loaded.
The good news is in the same data: some sites loaded the infected script and nothing happened, because their content security policy (CSP) blocked it.
Report URI, analysis of affected sites' policies, November 16-17, 2026
Trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy.
Four steps for your website
Inventory your scripts
List every third-party script your site loads, who asked for it and why. Remove the ones nobody uses anymore.
Turn on a strict CSP
Limit which domains can run code and where the page can send data. Avoid 'unsafe-eval' and enable reporting.
Isolate payments
Use your payment processor's hosted fields instead of your own form fields for card data.
If you use Optimizely
Review your projects' JavaScript, rotate credentials and tokens, and treat cards typed into your own forms on November 16 as exposed.

At Hitos we see this case as an uncomfortable reminder: your site's security also depends on vendors you do not control, and the first step is knowing what you have exposed.
Sources: Report URI · The Record · KrebsOnSecurity · Malwarebytes
Source: Report URI
